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Abstract 
In this study we try to observe whether growing China and India will Challenge the 
existing World Order or will they prefer status quo, and if they don’t then how they will assert 
themselves within the existing system. Based on reality checks, we concluded that India and China 
are not revisionist states and they prefer to follow the prevailing rules and norms, at least, for 
maintaining growth and ensuring stability at home. Similarly, China and India are in critical 
stages of transition where any misdemeanor of challenging ‘World Order’ or each other can 
jeopardize their efforts and can bring them to squire one. Direct confrontation in increasingly 
interdependent world is losing appeal while wide spread domestic reforms are converging policies 
and is increasing interdependence between China and India. Similarly, proximity, rising status 
within the system, common experience of colonization and emphasis on order and stability are 
some out and inside pressures that is reshaping the relationship of China and India and shows that 
there is a lot between them to cooperate than to confront. Though the two countries are not in a 
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position to challenge the existing order, however, their relations will change the structure, if not 
the rules, of the order.  
 
JEL Classification: F5 
Key Words: World Order, Transition Economies, Policy Convergence, Regionalism, Gross 
National Income, Bilateral Trade, Cooperation, Confrontation,   
  
Introduction 
Recently a number of studies have predicted the rise of China and India under the 
assumption of possible rebalance, if not out right decline, in the power of the West. China and 
India are considered serious contenders who will challenge the existing ‘World Order’ and will 
compete for political, economic and strategic dominance. Their rise, particularly of China and 
prevailing ambiguity of her future course of action has already activated alarms in the West as 
well as in some parts of Asia. 
 
 Though China and India, both, are dubbed as potential contender to the existing order, 
but the existing stake holders seem to be more uneasy with the rise of China than that of India 
and therefore have divergent policies towards the two. The west hedge against China and 
consider India as a natural security partner. They also presumes China and India as adversaries, 
and thus pat India as a balancing chip against China in the region. Indo-China war in 1962 and 
persisting territorial disputes since then between the two neighboring countries give credential to 
such presumptions. On the other hand, China considers the shift in policies of major power 
towards Asia Pacific and South East Asia as a calculated effort to contain and isolate her. China 
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is also weary of Western deals with India. Thus it seems that as China and India grow, they will 
lock horns and will challenge the existing ‘Order’ to grab more power in order to dictate the 
world by their terms. 
 
History is evident that any change in prevailing orders or transition of power in 
international politics is not without destruction. Therefore, any effort by India and China to 
challenge each other or to challenge the prevailing system will increase the possibility of another 
cold war. But luckily, the calculated efforts by the two and the increasing interdependency 
among nation states by the start of new millennium present a different picture, where 
confrontation among states are relegated deep down on the list of options. The era of ‘mutual 
destruction’ compelled many hostile nations to think ‘out of box’ and reconsider cooperation as 
vital route for success.  
 
 China and India are no exceptions. In the recent past, the two countries reduced barrier 
to trade and enhanced economic relations that paved way for further cooperation on economic 
and non-economic issues, including peace and stability, within the region and around the world. 
Resultantly, the increasing cooperation between China and India is going to change the 
theoretical ball game when speculating which rising power could be the next greatest power and 
under which conditions. So, the question arises whether China and India will challenge the 
current ‘World Order’ to impose supremacy or will they play by the existing rules? And if not 
then how China and India will assert themselves within the system? How Chinese and Indian 
cooperation can contribute to the region and beyond and under what assumptions? In this paper 
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we will try to address the aforementioned questions and underline the areas of utmost importance 
that deserve attention from China and India in order to stand up together for future challenges.  
 
China, India and the Existing Order 
By the mid of twentieth century, unprecedented changes in political thoughts and issues 
in the balance of power erupted from the ashes of Second World War. Ideological rifts between 
un-natural allies of the war i.e. Soviet Union and the Western bloc soon divided the world along 
the fault lines of communism and capitalism. The ideological division between the two blocs was 
clear and the effort to govern the global affairs by their terms was obvious. The newly 
decolonized states were attracted and lured to join the exclusive clubs of the two powers that put 
many of the nascent states in catch twenty-two situation and increased their fear of 
re-colonization by other means and modes. Capitalist statesmen such as Churchill and Roosevelt, 
unified to defeat communism, tried to allay the fear of neo-colonization by putting the old wine 
of control in a new bottle of euphemism, stamped that with ‘carrot and stick’ and branded it by 
the name of ‘World Order’; the unwritten rules that governed the world affairs and the important 
relationships of the interstate system for decades to come. 
 
Though the ‘World Order’ was not a written document or signed agreement, but its 
strong endorsement by the Western bloc made it a rubric of how to conduct relations among 
states on economic, political and ideological fronts. The ‘Order’ survived cold and hot wars and 
played a significant role in governing global affairs, particularly from the Western perspective. 
The unwritten rules of the ‘Order’ provided a solid foundation for various formal institutions 
(ranging from Breton Woods’ system to NATO) that were tactfully used by the capitalist bloc to 
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underscore the importance of liberal institutions, democracy and Americanization. After the cold 
war, the ‘World Order’ was reinvigorated around Western political and economic thoughts and 
referred by some scholars as the end of mankind’s ideological evolution and the start of 
universalization of liberal ideologies
2
. For example, to Fukuyama, the change and drift towards 
liberal values, and thus to the Western ideology, is irresistible. The argument sensed plausible 
when the debacle of communism created huge ideological vacuum and threatened the existence 
of many nation states. Many of them demonstrated pragmatic realism and rushed to embrace 
liberalism in various forms and formats
3
. Resultantly, a number of communist and socialist 
countries realigned themselves to ‘change’ and tried to integrate themselves to the world 
economy which later paved the way for them to ascend the ranks of power.  
 
India and China, the origin of two great civilizations, enjoyed power till the rise of the 
West in the 17
th
 century. Since then, Western powers have dominated world affairs in economic, 
intellectual, scientific and military terms that are referred to as the ‘Anglo-American Era’. In that 
era the West monopolized and considered it their prerogative to devise and implement the rules 
and order to govern global affairs. However, it was not without cost for other countries and 
regions. The West consolidated their dominance by subjugating and colonizing non-European 
regions and by ‘kicking away the ladder of development’ from the reach of others4. They 
                                            
2
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 Liberalism was accepted in bits and pieces. It took not very long time for nation states to embrace 
economic liberalism; however, the process of political liberalism is still dragging feet to make way in 
many countries across the globe.   
4
 Ha-Joon Chang, “Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective”, (Anthem 
Press, 2002)  
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imposed their cultural values and ideologies on the colonies and purged indigenous customs and 
traditions. China and India, the two emerging powers, went through this experience when they 
were defeated, colonized and ruled by the West. Today, it is difficult for China to forget the 
‘Century of Humiliation’ and India has yet to escape the shadow of two centuries of subjugation. 
Even after independence, political and economic powers, enmeshed in cold war mentality and 
equipped with ‘Orders’, dictated the two countries for decades to come.     
 
Today India and China are emerging powers. They have already started leaving footprints 
on the world. The rise of China and India, the economic and political heavyweights, has changed 
the predictable list of great powers in the twenty first century. Their ability to influence other 
societies as well as the behavior of international institution is on rise. They are unique in many 
aspects. They are the two most populated countries in the world with a large landmass and have 
thousands of years of uninterrupted history. They were the power house of the world for 
millennia and the birth place of important invention and innovations. Today, they are again the 
economic hubs and major contributors to global output. Their military, economic and political 
clout is on rise.  
 
 Since Jim’s O’Neill wrote about their emerging role5, the two neighboring countries 
further consolidated their positions on world stage. Minor players in the global economy in the 
1980’s, China today is the world’s second largest trading power, while India has spawned some 
world-class companies; for example, Infosys, Tata and Reliance Industries. Over the last three 
                                            
5 Jim O’Neill, “Building Better Global Economic BRIC”, Goldman Sachs, Global Economic Paper No. 
66 (2001) 
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decades China has grown by 10
6
 percent per annum and has shown great resilience to the 2008 
financial crisis. China holds over three trillion dollars in hard currency reserves
7
 and has 
sufficient resources, like labor and high saving rate, to grow by 8
8
 percent in the next ten to 
twenty years. Meanwhile, India, the biggest democracy in the world, has grown by 6
9
 percent 
per annum since 1980 and became a hot destination for international investment. A plethora of 
reports predict that by 2025, China and India will have the world's second and fourth-largest 
economies, and by 2040 they will be first and second largest economies, respectively. Other 
reports see China to be world’s largest economy bit earlier by 202510. China and India are 
recognized nuclear powers and the increasing stake of the two in world affairs are pushing them 
to develop blue-water navies. China’s first aircraft carrier ‘the Liaoning’ was handed over to the 
PLA (Peoples Liberation Army) in an auspicious ceremony on 25th November, 2012, while 
India is in a deal with long time ally Russia to acquire refurbished aircraft carrier INS 
Vikramaditya by the last quarter of 2013. China and India is expanding their reach by exploring 
new political and economic relationships with Latin America and Africa in order to secure raw 
material, market access and to influence them. At the same time, they start asking for reforms in 
international institutions and have demanded representation at international institutions 
                                            
6 Report for Selected Countries and Subjects", (www.Imf.org) 
7 China’s foreign reserve assets reached to $3.3 trillion by the end of September, 2012.  
8 China Has Potential to grow Annually by 7-8% in 2 decades” (accessed  December 15, 2012) 
http//www.bjinvest.gov.cn/english/bn/200903/t349092.htm 
9 Report for Selected Countries and Subjects", (www.Imf.org) 
10 A report by Frost and Sullivan ‘China to See Unparalleled Urban Growth with 13 Mega Cities, 4 
Mega Regions and 6 Mega Corridors by 2025’ (accessed December 29, 2012) 
http//www.frost.com/prod/servlet/frost-home.pag  
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commensurate with their powers. Therefore, their rise reflects a glimpse in a dramatic shift of 
power from the core to the semi-peripheries, or return of the power to the origin. This will have 
significant impact on global affairs and established norms i.e. on the existing ‘World Order’.  
 
 So, the ‘Power Transition’ approaches assert that China and India will demand greater roles 
in the international order and then subsequently will challenge the existing system once they 
have the economic and military strength to do so
11
. Offensive realists
12
 argue that China, like all 
previous potential hegemonies will be strongly inclined to become a real hegemony, as long as 
her power continues to grow. Though, India and China may have abandoned obscurity for great 
power politics but the suspicion that their real intentions, particularly of China, remain hidden is 
at the heart of many observations
13
. Some observers believe that rising states’ attitudes towards 
world order are not fixed but mixed and depends on the context. Therefore, the developing status 
of China and India will not allow them to challenge the existing system, at least in ways that can 
cause global instability and can back fire. Yet, the rise of China and India took the world by 
storm of uncertainty and ambiguity about their approach to the existing ‘order’ and their dealing 
with it.    
 
Is the World Order in Transition?  
                                            
11
 Goldstein, “Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and International Security”, (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2005),.  
12
 Mearsheimer, “The Rise of China Will Not Be Peaceful at All”, (The Australian, 2005).   
13 Geis, J. and B. Holt, “Harmonious Society: Rise of the New China”, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol 
3(4), 2009. 
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‘World order” simply refers to the rules that govern the most important relationships of 
the interstate system’. The ‘Order’ is not static but follows a dynamic path. As the world changes 
so do the rules of the ‘Order’ and players in the ‘game’. In the last decade or two the highly 
charged process of globalization diffused power from a few cores to different poles. South and 
south cooperation is on the rise and is going to correct the injustices in North and South relations. 
Reforms in the Breton Woods institutions are the center of many debates
14
. Soft powers are 
shaping and smart powers are in action
15
. Regionalism in the Global South is resurging and 
social movements in different parts of the world are eroding the power of neo-liberal ideologues. 
The Beijing consensus is reverberating while the Washington consensus is shaking. Strategic 
interests of developed and developing countries are converging. Ecological limits to growth, 
security and prosperity will possibly prevent gun point invasions and subversion of other 
sovereign states, while increased interdependency made ‘pooring thy neighboring’ tantamount to 
‘pooring thyself’. The distinction between issues of high and low politics are fading away16. 
Resultantly, the chances of expansive showdowns are on decline and the importance of rule 
bound cooperation is on rise. Simply, the ‘World Order’ is on the move from ‘vertical,’ where 
Western political systems, wealth and ideas are above, to ‘horizontal,’ in which there will be 
co-operation, mutual learning and perhaps benign competition between different ideas and 
systems. The transition towards new equilibrium seems to be imperative.   
 
                                            
14
 H. A. Kissinger, “The Chance for a New World Order” (accessed on November 1, 2012). 
http://www.disinfo.com/2009/02/the-chance-for-a-new-world-order-by-henry-a-kissinger/ 
15
 Joseph S. Nye, The Future of Power, (Public Affairs, 2011)  
 
16
 The former referring to politics dealing with security and the latter referring to non-security politics 
 10 
 A number of developing countries including Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa 
along with Indonesia and Turkey are on a journey to catch up the developed nations. In the last 
three decades, the developing world's share of global gross domestic product (GDP) in 
purchasing power parity terms increased from 33.7% in 1980 to 43.4% in 2010. Asia's share (32 
percent) of the global economy markets crossed that of USA (30 percent) and EU (25 percent). 
From 1995 to 2008, South-South merchandise trade doubled to 20 % of world trade and nearly 
70% of South-South trade is attributed to intra-Asian trade
17
. This shows that the center of 
economic activities is also experiencing a shift towards new direction and that is the sign of a 
multi-polar world where instead of a unified concept of globalization, main players will interact 
with each other from emerging regional cores.   
  
 The new era of regionalism based on interest and independent of geography will surge 
and globality
18
 will replace Globalization. Peter Drucker
19
 considers that the demands of 
'knowledge economy' will make regionalism necessary and highly desirable where the real 
power will not be judged by the capacity of destruction but by the ability of creation and 
contribution. Regionalism within globalized context is taking precedence in world politics and 
economics. Aaron Friedberg
20
 consider that today the dominant trend in world politics is 
                                            
17
 Various Reports of UNCTAD, retrieved from http://www.unctad.org/en/Pages/Statistics.aspx 2010 
18
 Globality is characterized by the rise of companies that are based in rapidly developing economies and 
do business in new, and often very different, ways.  
19
 Peter Drucker, “Post-Capitalist Society”, (London: Butterworth Heinemann, 1993). 
20
 Aaron, “Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia”, International Security , Vol 
18(3), 1994.  
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towards regionalization and fragmentation than towards globalization and unification, while 
Rostow
21
 and Richard Rosecrance
22
 consider that ‘the coming age is of regionalism’ and predict 
‘the rise of region states’ in the post cold war era. Interestingly, on the other hand, the Chinese 
version of world orders like the theory of Tian Xia
23
 believes in world integration rather than 
fragmentation by ‘transforming enemies into friends’. Tian Xia put emphasis on attraction of 
masses rather than conquering them and considers that the chaotic world needs efficient ‘order’ 
not empty ‘freedom’. In between the two poles, Ian Bremmer has his own version of ‘G-Zero 
world’24 in which no country will take the lead to organize political and economic coalition to 
find solution for collective problems.  
 
The rise of the new players and the receding power of the traditional ‘rule setters’ depict 
that transition is crucial where uni-polarity will be replaced by multi-polar era in world politics. 
The recent global financial crisis, that engulfed the developed countries, has accelerated the 
process of rebalancing the highly tilted ‘World Order’. But it does not mean that the existing 
order is going to vanish soon or it will be easily replaced by another setup. For any change to 
occur, the current system will play the role of indispensable and inevitable pivot.   
 
                                            
21
 W. W. Rostow, “The Coming Age of Regionalism”, Encounter Vol 74(5), 1990. 
22
 R. Richard, “Regionalism and the Post-Cold War Era”, International Journal, Vol 46, 991. 
23
 T. Zhao, “Rethinking Empire from a Chinese Concept of All-under-Heaven”, (Tian Xia), Social 
Identities Vol 12(1), 2006. 
24
 Ian Bremmer, “Every Nation for Itself: Winners and Losers in a G-Zero World”, (Portolio, May 
2012) 
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China and India: Revisionist or Status-quo States 
Now the question arises, will the emerging powers, particularly China and India, want to 
take on and challenge the established international system? Are China and India status quo or 
revisionist states? And how would the two emerging actors develop their own rules in case the 
major players, particularly the US, break away from the established norms? What forms will 
their cooperation take and how they will adjust to work within the system? Therefore, the role of 
emerging Asian powers in endorsing current global governance and promoting their own rules is 
open to speculation.  
 
 Power transition theory suggests that a rising power satisfied with the existing international 
order is less likely to instigate instability by changing or challenging the system, while a rising 
power dissatisfied with the existing setup will try to replace it
25
. Not surprisingly, a burgeoning 
literature considers the broader global consequences of China’s rise in this back drop26. 
                                            
25 Kugler, J. and D. Lemke, “The Power Transition Research Program: Assessing Theoretical and 
Empirical Advances” (2000), In Handbook of War Studies II, edited by Manus I. Levy, J. S. (2008), 
“Power Transition Theory and the Rise of China. In China’s Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future 
of International Politics”, (ed) Robert S. Ross, and Zhu Feng. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
26
 Saunders, “China’s Global Activism: Strategy, Drivers, and Tools”, Institute for National Strategic 
Studies, Occasional Paper 4 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2006); David 
Shambaugh, “Return to the Middle Kingdom? China and Asia in the Early Twenty-First Century”, In 
Power Shift: China & Asia’s New Dynamics, edited by David Shambaugh. (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2005); B. Gill, “Rising Star: China’s New Security Diplomacy”, (Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution, 2007); D. C. Kang, China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia, (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2007). 
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 Some assert that the international system still revolves around the Western belief that China 
will resist because of her bitter experience during the hundred years of humiliation and then three 
decades of confrontation with the West after independence. Interestingly India does not come 
under this kind of suspicion. However, it is not as simple and it may be more complicated to 
define friends or foes.  Another view is that China and India have regained power through the 
current system, so they are not going to challenge the system. Analysts also believe that the two 
countries have not yet developed the capacity to initiate and take the burden of change. 
Therefore, a more plausible possibility is that China and India will take a more prominent role 
within the system rather than taking over the system. A third line of reasoning suggests that 
China and India will modify and fundamentally remake the current international system based on 
their experience of shame and subjugation. Debate on ‘Tianxia’, a Chinese version of world 
order in China and revering Chanakia by Indian is a step in that direction. 
 
 But it is not easy to analyze whether China and India really want to replace the existing 
system and introduce a ‘New World Order’. Some studies have tried to verify the behavior of 
emerging states by analyzing their role from different dimensions to conclude whether they 
support or reject the existing system. For example, Kim
27
 assumes that the countries who are 
dissatisfied with the existing system have different allies from that of the dominant states. 
                                                                                                                                            
 
27 Sameul Kim, “China, the United Nations” in E. Economy and M. Oksenberg (eds.), China Joins the 
World: Progress and Prospects, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999). 
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Werner and Kugler
28
 consider a rapid increase in military spending another indication that states 
want change. By the standard of the above two assertions, India as the world’s largest 
(proclaimed) democracy and a close ally of the West has always avoided reaching out to the anti 
West bloc, or any action that would alienate the West. Recently, the newly appointed foreign 
minister of India Salman Khurshid called off his planned trip to Iran in order not to annoy the 
West
29
. Perhaps India has limited leverage to maneuver out of the system because of her security 
and economic dependence on the West. In the last two decades India’s military spending 
increased rapidly along with rapid economic growth but it is less likely that India’s military build 
up will pose a challenge to the ‘Order’. India fought wars with two neighboring countries, 
Pakistan and China, and territorial disputes with them are still lingering. Therefore, India’s 
military spending in context of external threat can show a different picture, particularly vis-à-vis 
China. India wants to keep pace with China’s military spending30. At the same time India’s rising 
defense spending is an effort to consolidate her status of emerging power. This shows that the 
rise in India’s military spending is more to maintain balance of power within the region than to 
challenge the global system.   
 
                                            
28
 Werner, S. and J. Kugler, “Power Transition and Military Buildups:  Resolving the Relationship 
between Arms Buildups and War”, In: Jacek Kugler & Doug Lemke (eds) Parity and War: A Critical 
Evaluation of the War Ledger. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press (1996). 
29
 “At last minute, Khurshid calls off his visit to Iran” The Indian Express (accessed November 25, 2012) 
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30
 Gabe Collins and Andrew Erickson, ‘India Plays Catch-up with China: Asia’s titan boost 2011 defense 
budgets” ,” China SignPost™ (洞察中国), No. 29 (14 March 2011) 
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 China also shows great caution in dealing with pariah states after integration to the world 
system. China is the only state that holds a formal alliance with North Korea; however, Beijing 
does not endorse all the acts of the isolated neighbor. China receives regular criticism from the 
West for its huge military budget, but that can not be translated into Chinese intention of 
remaking of the existing order. China has four nuclear neighbors and has regional disputes with 
half a dozen neighboring states. At the same time, United States and allies are digging deep and 
increasing strength in Asia pacific. China military spending together is far below then the 
military spending of the major stake holder of current system i.e. the United States of America. 
Same is the case with India. In 2012, China defense budget was just $106.4 billion while India’s 
defense budget was $ 48.9 billion compared to $ 711 billion of the USA. In between 2005 and 
2010, china and India’s military spending as a percent of GDP (gross domestic product) 
decreased from 1.3 percent to 1.25 and 2.6 to 2.4 percent, respectively; while in the same period 
USA defense budget increased from 3.9 to 4.6 percent of GDP
31
.    
 
Therefore, China and India’s military spending is considered more a consequence of 
possible regional or international security dilemmas and less of their desire to take over the 
system
32
. China and India want to maintain deterrence along with growth and project power 
beyond peripheries, but not by confirming to offence-oriented operational military doctrines. 
                                            
31
 The Economist (accessed Feb 19, 2013)  
www.economist.com.hk/blogs/dailychart/2011/03/defence_budgets 
32
 Neighbors with Difference: The India-China Relationship in Context (available at 
www.upclose.unimelb.edu.au) 
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They know that offence oriented doctrine will destabilize the whole region and ultimately their 
own countries. 
  
 Despite concerns about the ambitious nature of both China and India, the evidence of 
scholarship for over a decade suggests that in the United Nations, in the Breton Woods 
institutions and the World Trade Organization, China and India have more often been rule takers 
than challengers to the existing international order
33
. Johnston
34
 also confirmed that on the basis 
of China’s participation in international institutions and her willingness to challenge the system, 
China is more of a status quo rather than a revisionist power. In the last three decades, China has 
been transformed from the World Order’s antagonist and revolutionary challenger to a critic and 
advantage-taker. Today China endorsed and is the proactive mover and shaker of the existing 
system.  
 
 In the recent past, China and India showed dedication and committed resources to the 
prevailing system that facilitated their rise and is important for their stability. After 2008 
financial and recent EU sovereign debt crises, China and India’s behavior is more cooperative. 
China firmly stood for free trade and urged trade partners (United States and EU) not to go for 
                                            
33 Woosang Kim, “Alliance Transitions and Great Power War”, American Journal of Political Science 
Vol 35(4), 1991; Wei, “China: Globalization and the Emergence of a New Status Quo Power?”, Asian 
Perspective Vol 31(4), 2007.  
34
 Alastiar I. Johnston, “Is China a Status-Quo Power?”, International Security Vol 27(4), 2003. 
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protectionism
35
. No doubt, Chinese domestic politics still revolve around the communist 
ideology, but their engagement in international politics and diplomacy is not at odds with 
existing ‘Order’. China is trying to deal with other international actors (such as the United States, 
India etc) within the system. Even it is considered that possible conflict between the US and 
China on locking up energy and strategic commodities
36
 or India and China’s struggle for 
regional influence, may be within the system.  
 
Another argument in favor of China as status quo is that, China is the biggest creditor and 
trade partner of the United States, and therefore, the time of China as an existential adversary of 
the US and US backed system have passed. China’s interest and policies are converging on 
major stake holders of the system. Today China shares an increasingly common set of values, 
practices, and outlooks with other global actors
37
.  At the same time, the world entered into an 
era of ‘new security concept’: ‘dialogue’, ‘cooperation’ and ‘mutual trust, mutual benefit, 
equality and coordination’38 that allowed ‘states to treat each other as partners or at least as 
                                            
35
 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/19/press-conference-president-obama-and-president
-hu-peoples-republic-china 
36
 Leverett, F. and P. Noel, “The New Axis of Oil”, The New Republic Vol 84(65), 2006.   
 
37 Edward S., “Steinfeld, Playing Our Game: Why China’s Rise Doesn’t Threaten the West”, (Oxford 
University Press, 2010). 
38
 China’s Position Paper on the New Security Concept,” (accessed December 19, 2012) 
www.fmprc.gov.cn 
 18 
neither friend nor foe’39. Gone are also the days when states were only looked upon as hostile 
and adversaries. Today nation states are more pragmatic and less suspicious of each other.  
 
 International trade and increasing economic interdependence remind us that we are in an age 
of ‘power of dependence’. Today states economic and security (nontraditional) interests are 
inextricably bound with what happens in the rest of the world or in a region
40
. Interdependence 
leads to unprecedented cooperation and policy coordination where regional and international 
organizations start playing dominant role to ensure security and maintain political and economic 
stability. Therefore, the possibility that India and China will challenge the existing order or will 
directly confront each other is very low.  
 
China and India: Adversaries or Partners   
 Even if India and China don’t want to change the system, still their growth momentum, 
political rise, and policy convergence or their cooperation will significantly alter the course of 
actions within the system. The two countries have a long history of exchange of goods and ideas. 
Chinese culture and society were deeply influenced by Buddhism whose roots can be traced to 
India. Similarly, Indian revered Chinese culture and inventions. But the 1962 war bedeviled their 
relations for decades and cultivated a huge trust deficit between them. Both states considered 
each other as adversary and were hostile to each other. However, the recent rapprochement of the 
                                            
39
 J. Shi, “Getting China Right: The Chinese World Order and Asia–Pacific Regional Integration”, 
Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (2008) [English language edition].  
40
 Breslin, “Understanding China’s Regional Rise: Interpretations, Identities and Implications”, 
International Affairs 85:4 (2009)  
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two shows that either it dawned upon them that coexistence is a viable option or their interests 
start converging. India was the first stop of new Chinese premier Li Keqiang. In the recent visit 
of Indian Premier Manmohan Singh in October 2013, China and India signed a landmark border 
pact and the two countries agreed to study the potential for a bilateral regional trade arrangement. 
Rapid rise of China and India increased their level of interdependence and therefore, their focus 
on areas of complementarity. Strong economic growth and their improving diplomatic and trade 
relations have led many to dub the two countries as 'Chindia'.  
 
 Similarly, the widespread liberalization and reforms in India and China focused on domestic 
growth produced a new cadre of ‘elites’41and brought them closer. The structures, processes, and 
performances of their policies grew more alike and in one generation China and India leapt from 
Maoism and socialism to Reaganism and Thatcherism. Investment flew in and across the Indian 
and Chinese borders along with new ideas. Trade between India and China increased by leap and 
bound from $2.92 billion in 2000 to $ 73 billion in 2012. It is expected that it will reach to $ 100 
billion by 2015. China is the top source of India’s imports (12 percent of total) and the third 
largest destination for Indian exports (6.5 percent of the total). Despite the fact India has trade 
deficit problem with China, they behave more like a partner than adversaries. China and India 
together constitute 36 percent of world population (China 19 percent and India 17 percent). Huge 
labor force gives them comparative advantages.  Luce and Kynge
42
 quoted Indian entrepreneur 
                                            
41 Elites plays an important role in shaping consciousness that is vital in determining interstate 
and interfaith relations  
42 Luce, E., and K, James, “India Starts To See China As A Land Of Business Opportunity”, Financial 
Times (2003). 
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that rising China is an opportunity rather than a threat. Similarly, Chinese entrepreneur can not 
ignore the importance of Indian market. India and China are world power houses and together 
they contribute to half of total increase in world output in 2012 (china 40 percent and India 15 
percent). 
 
On issues of global governance, India and China seems to be on the same page. Their 
voting records in the UN General Assembly show that on issues like Iran, Sudan, Burma, Middle 
East security and nuclear proliferation, they are markedly closer to each other than to the USA. 
They developed a pressure group and fought together against the lack of movement by developed 
countries on issues of subsidies in Doha round of negotiations. Their joint communiqué issued 
on 9 August, 2007 says,  
  
  “Unless the outcome of the negotiations upholds the proposals of developing 
countries resulting in real and effective reduction of trade distorting domestic 
support coupled with meaningful disciplines, substantial improvement in market 
access by developed countries and eliminations of all form of export subsidies the 
aspirations of the developing countries, as built in the mandate, will not be fulfilled” 
43
.  
 
This shows that China and India’s interdependence is increasing but their cooperation is 
dictated only by vested interest and by non political imperatives, and therefore, the possibility 
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 India, China Take Common Stand on WTO Doha Round Issues (accessed August 20) 
http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=26914 
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that they will violently compete for wide economic and geopolitical interest within and outside 
the region can not be ruled out. The two countries government policies toward each other in 
recent years has been driven more by bureaucratic expertise and military demands rather than by 
political vision. That does not bode well to support flexible and long term cooperative relations. 
Though, to large extent China and India have reshaped their relations from adversaries to 
non-hostile states, but they need to go beyond economic interdependence and required to address 
India’s fear of hegemony and China’s fear of encirclement. Otherwise they will miss the 
opportunities to fix the problems in prevailing ‘Order’ and stand for the developing world. 
Therefore, an important mean to this end is to develop regional and sub-regional cooperation by 
‘seeking clear truths from murky facts’ i.e. understanding the region from within rather than 
taking the dictations from outside.   
 
Theoretical Framework for Stable Partnership 
So, the question is on which ground viable relation can be built? Particularly when ‘The 
Five Principals of Peaceful Coexistence’ did not survive more than eight years after that was first 
codified in agreement by China and India in 1954. But the ‘principles’ still can provide solid 
foundation for long lasting relations. They are 
 Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, 
 Mutual non-aggression, 
 Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, 
 Equality and mutual benefit, and 
 Peaceful Co-existence 
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The principles reflect the concept of peaceful coexistence, the everlasting and 
fundamental stance of China’s foreign policy confirm the stand of India on how to conduct 
international relations and protect vital interests. The principles also support Indian stance of non 
polarized and non-hegemonic world and negates the idea that Asian countries must choose 
between a Chinese or American future.  
 
 China and India are aspiring to play a global role. Therefore, they understand the 
importance of regionalism and the significance of regional cooperation and institutions.
44
 They 
are aware of each other growing status and their mutual importance. China assured neighbors of 
her peaceful intentions
45
 and India is trying to win over neighbors too
46
. India and China are 
co-members or observers of many regional organizations (from ASEAN to APEC); however, 
there are no direct pacts between Delhi and Beijing. Therefore, their growing status compel them 
to consider their position from regional perspective, where the range of factors that may be 
implicated in the growth of regionalism between India and China can take economic, social, 
political, cultural and historic dimensions as well as understanding that the two countries are in 
different stages of development.  
 
                                            
44
 David Shambaugh, Return to the Middle Kingdom? China and Asia in the Early Twenty-First 
Century”, In Power Shift: China & Asia’s New Dynamics, edited, 2005 
45
 Zheng, “China’s Peaceful Rise to Great Power Status”, Foreign Affairs, 84:5 (2005).  
46
 They have disputes with a number of countries. Therefore, before taking global responsibility they 
have to resolves serious issues, at least, with neighboring countries.   
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The process of regional engagement has no fix boundaries and regionalism is not 
‘natural’. Regionalism is socially constructed and politically contested. In this back drop, in the 
following paragraphs we try to figure out which theoretical underpinning China and India can 
follow to enhance cooperation.  
 
 For those who subscribe to the realist school of thought, regionalism is the only viable 
option for weak states to coexist along with powerful states. Therefore, regionalism is the impact 
of outside (hegemonic) pressure and the politics of alliance
47
 formation does not take domestic 
factors in to consideration. Realists do not believe in the power of economics in integration and 
they consider the international political system as the driving force behind economic and other 
forms of regional integration. The widely debated realist theories of regionalism and regional 
cooperation can be understood in the back drop of European integration, however, they lost 
wherewith to explain the surge in regionalism in post cold war era, particularly in areas that lacks 
hegemonic interpretation of regional cooperation. ASEAN is one of the examples. Emerging 
powers in Asia not only lack the ability to subdue each other. Therefore, under realist assumption 
of political competition, hegemony and mercantilism, the two big giants of Asia have limited 
opportunity to cooperate and take advantage of each other. 
 
 Globalization is another approach that looks at regionalism as a whole by putting states 
ecologically, strategically and economically in the same boat. Globalization and structural 
interdependence compelled states to put aside national egoisms and join hands to address the 
issues of common interest and challenges. Structural change in the international system increased 
                                            
47
  Stephen M. Walt, “The Origins of Alliances”, (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1987). 
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social and economic interdependence where technological change made geography irrelevant
48
.  
Therefore, scholars are debating the claim that regionalism in this highly interconnected world 
needs to be addressed by new approaches.  
 
 Among the structural interdependence theorists, Joseph Nye pointed to two areas for 
regional cooperation, micro-economic and macro-political organization
49
. The first involves 
formal economic integration characterized by formal institutional structures, where markets, 
private trade, investment flows and private companies pave way for cooperation; while the later 
is important to control conflict by constructing inter-state or inter-governmental agreements or 
regimes. The main concept of micro-economic and macro-political organization is a reflection of 
interdependence of realism and liberalism. Domestic reforms by China and India and their rapid 
growth have increased their economic interdependence; however, a number of unresolved issues 
(e.g China’s claim to Arunachal Pradesh and India’s support to Tibetan government in exile) still 
hold them back from proceeding to cooperation on the macro-political front. Constructivist and 
domestic level theories of state coherence directs attention to the discursive interplay of 
subjectively constructed ideas in forming the interest, identities and structure to define 
cooperation
50
. Constructivist emphasizes multilateralism over unilateralism and positive sum 
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win-win situation over zero-sum power struggle. But the problem of constructivist ideology in 
terms of China and India is that they both have different cultures, political systems, structure of 
governance and distinguished identity which hardly pave way for long lasting cooperation, 
within and beyond the region.   
 
 Theories that underline the functional response of the state consider that starting with 
technical and non controversial issues will generate a momentum that can lead to enhanced 
cooperation and greater political integration. Neo-functionalism considers that the level of 
complexity of issues actually does not reduce but increases cooperation among states by 
necessitating the existence of supranational institutions to govern the affairs. China and India 
already started cooperating on a number of issues of economic interest that will bring them 
closer. But it does not mean that they shun competing in other areas at all. Territorial dispute, 
outside influence and lack of serious efforts to understand each other provide less fertile land for 
supranational institution to blossom.   
 
 Generalized neoliberal institutionalist theories, among others, provide sound footing for 
regionalism. Neoliberal theories address the issues of regional cooperation by building institution 
with clear purpose and limited authority. Further, the institutions are more ‘statist’ in nature and 
they don’t override on state authority. They also formalize the forms of interdependence and give 
way to strategic interaction. That will ultimately lead to enhanced cooperation. China and India 
                                                                                                                                            
Progress in Political Science”, Perspective on Political Science 1:4 (2003) 
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already entered to soft regionalism. Therefore, under the auspices of neoliberal theories, they 
together can develop an effective partnership to address the issues of utmost importance.  
 
China and India’s cooperation is not a new area. Historically the two relied on each other 
for exchange of idea and trade for centuries, however, without formal institutions and proper 
market mechanism. External pressure never compelled them to formalize relations. The two 
countries curved different path to fight the colonialist and then adopted divergent policies from 
late 1940’s to early 1990’s to tackle domestic imperatives. In early 1990’s the process of 
globalization based on neo-liberal ideologies brought them in line and being developing 
countries put their stake together.  
 
Realist and liberals point to important factors that explain the outcome in question, 
however, their relative importance varies. In particular, we argue that the liberal approach 
provides a ground where China and India can build an effective long lasting partnership without 
losing identity or confronting the existing system, rather their participation will strengthen the 
existing structure of global governance. In order to measure the interdependence of China, India 
and US, we devise the following methodology. 
 
Empirical Analysis of Interdependence  
In order to support our argument, we collected the GNI (gross national income) and trade 
data for China, India and the USA to empirically confirm their level of interdependence. We 
selected GNI because the concept of GNI is broader than GDP and better reflects the economic 
power and political influence of a country across the globe. We collected GNI and Trade data 
 27 
from World Development Indicators (World Bank) given in Appendix 1. We use GNI to check 
long as well as short term co-integration by employing Vector Error Correction Cointegration 
technique while we use Granger and Augmented Granger Causality tests to determining the path 
of trade dependency among the three countries (methodology adopted in this paper is gives in the 
Appendix 1)  
Insert Table 1 here 
 
Insert Table 2 here 
 
Our results shows in Table 1 shows that the GNI of the three economies are cointegrated 
in long as well as in short run when China and US GNI’s are dependent variables. The result 
indicates that a one percent increase in US GNI increases Chinese GNI by 0.5 percent. Similarly, 
the negative and significant coefficient of error term (ECM-1) in case when US GNI is 
dependent variables shows that US GNI has a long run relationship with US and Indian GNI. US 
and Chinese GNI confirm significant long and short run result. however, Indian GNI failed to 
failed to show both long and short run relation with the US and Chinese GNI. Negative 
significant values of ECMt-1 on one hand confirm long run relation and on the other hand show 
that Chinese GNI reverts to equilibrium within in three years after any change or shocks, while 
that of US takes 5 years to revert back to equilibrium. This confirms that big economies are 
interlinked and depends on each other.   
 
Our results of Variance Decomposition (table 2) and Impulse response function (fig 1) 
indicates positive relations between Chinese GNI and the GNI of US and India, while in Case of 
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India and US the response is not positive. Variance decomposition results shows that changes in 
Indian GNI explain Chinese GNI by 11 percent compared to 1.3 percent by US GNI in 4th time 
period. Similarly, Chinese GNI explains India GNI by 32 percent in 4th time period compared to 
0.2 percent by the US GNI. Chinese GNI also explains 30 percent variation in US GNI in first 
time period. This shows that Chinese GNI is closely linked to the GNI of India and US.  
Insert Fig 1 here  
 
Similarly, Impulse response function in Fig 1 indicates positive relations between Chinese 
GNI and the GNI of US and India. China shows positive response in GNI due to standard shock 
stemming from US and India. This shows that India and US GNI explains the changes in 
Chinese GNI. In Case of India and US the response turns from positive to negative after 3 time 
period, while in Case of India and US the response turns from positive to negative after 3 time 
period.  
In case of trade dependence, our bi and multivariate granger causality results in tables 3 and 
4 confirm two-way causality in trade across the board between the three countries. The results in 
tables 3 and 4 give credence to our VDC findings. The significant two-way granger causality 
results shows that Indian trade not only cause Chinese and US trade but Indian Trade is also get 
caused by Chinese and US trade. Similarly, China and US cause and get caused each other trade. 
This shows that India and China are not only living in increasingly interdependent world but they 
themselves are interdependent on each other in many aspects.   
 
Inset Tables 3 and 4 here 
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Possible Impacts of China and India’s Cooperation 
 Though the empirical evidence and ground realities support the argument that China and 
India are less interested to confront or challenge the existing order for certain reason, but the 
impact of change in their internal or external policies is tacitly reshaping ‘world order’ from 
within by influencing peripheries without challenging the core of the ‘order’. Thus, their 
cooperation is bound to affect regions beyond their boundaries. China and India are two giants 
whose cooperation will change the landscape of continents from Asia to Africa and to Latin 
America. We can explain their role in changing world from the experience of ASEAN and 
NATO to show that how cooperation between China and India can avoid deadweight loss of 
senseless competition or outright confrontation to control others.   
 
The Association of South East Asian Nation was built on institutional framework based 
on liberal ideologue. ASEAN member countries shows huge diversity in term of size, culture, 
language, religion and history, yet their unprecedented cooperation based on discreteness, 
informality, consensus building and non-confrontational bargaining styles and legalistic decision 
makes ASEAN a huge attraction. Despite the fact that ASEAN member states consist of less than 
10 percent of world population and contribute not more than 5 percent to world GDP, yet World 
top economies and major players want to join them. ASEAN cooperation based on formal 
institution building has huge brand value. Recently ASEAN determined and shaped the identity 
of bigger regions e.g ASEAN plus three and ASEAN plus six etc. Similarly, NATO is another 
example where member state pool security, a very sensitive area, irrespective of religious and 
cultural differences and old rivalries. Their collective security reduces the burden and diverts 
scarce resources to efficient allocation elsewhere.   
 30 
 
On the same line, by institutionalizing their relations, China and India can efficiently 
allocate their scarce resources and can attract many regions to collaborate, including South 
Asia
51
. China and India’s cooperation will balance the power and will become a connecting force 
in the region that will pave the way for peace and development. This will drastically reduce the 
external challenges emanating from neighboring countries to India and will increase the standing 
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of China in the region. Alleviation of poverty and development in the South Asian region will 
provide a huge market for China and India.  
 
Similarly, China’s influence in central Asia is on rise. Many analyst dub SCO, regional 
equivalent of NATO, as success where China is playing a pivotal role.  Chinese and Indian 
cooperation will help India access central Asia and Russia, an old benefactor of India. In return, 
as a result of increasing interdependence, China can assure smooth flow of maritime activities in 
Indian Ocean. However, it seems an uphill task until the two neighboring countries introduce 
confidence building measures based on formal institution building to cure the mistrust.  
 
BRICS is another area where China and India’s cooperation will infuse huge energy to it.  
But the most important role the formal cooperation of the two can play is in Africa. Africa is no 
more a theater for developed or emerging nations to settle their score or compete for scarce 
resources. China and India is extensively investing in African continent and require African 
diplomatic support on issues of international importance. Africa is a major trade partner of China 
and India. Together, China and India can play a fair game and can change the empty rhetoric of 
African development to a reality. Their role in Africa will determine the skill of their global 
leadership and future of global governance. 
 
 The rise of Central and South Asia will tilt the order towards Asia while that of Africa 
will increase the say of developing world. Thus, cooperation between China and India will 
change structure without confronting the rules and core of the world order.     
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On internal issues, China and India’s economies are growing with impressive rate and in 
a decade or two they will surpass USA and EU. Since open up policies and liberalization, 
China’s share of world exports increased from less then 1 percent in early 1980’s to more than 
10 percent by 2011, while India’s share in world exports increased from 1 percent to 2 percent in 
the same period. Thus, China and India’s growing economies, expanding ecological footprints, 
and rising political influence require them to deal with common challenges collectively.  
 
In the last three decades the two countries pulled 650 million people out of poverty trap. 
However, 40 percent of India’s population, the majority of which are in the north of India, and 
20 percent of China’s population, especially in the west of China, are still living below poverty 
line. Therefore, in terms of internal challenges the two countries can help each other to reduce 
poverty by linking trade to poverty alleviation. China has a comparative advantage in industrial 
production, while India has advantage in the services sector. Therefore, increased trade across 
borders and setting up industrial zones in underserved areas will alleviate poverty on one hand 
and will make the growth more inclusive on the other. At the same time, increase in trade 
between China and India will provide a hedge against dip in exports in face of slump in global 
demands.  
 
India, like any other developed country concentrate on industrialization. However, half of 
Indian workforce and 20 percent of output depend on agriculture sector. Thus, for more balanced 
growth, India needs to create synergy between agriculture and industry and in this regard she can 
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learn from Chinese experience at the start of reforms
52
 in 1978. Indian can also learn from 
Chinese SoE’s (State Owned Enterprises) and infrastructure development. On the other hand, 
India’s advanced market based financial system and edge in IT sector can offer some lessons for 
China.  
 
Among others, border issues between China and India eclipsed their relations for long 
and still hinder them to develop a genuine partnership. Therefore, introduction of common 
security (macro-political) through mutual cooperation will be positive step in search of peace and 
progress. Similarly, ‘new security concept’ is another area where China and India’s cooperation 
will have long lasting affect on their partnership and on the region and that will pave some way 
for solving old disputes.    
 
 
 
Conclusion 
At the start of the twenty first century the world saw a dramatic shift from uni-polarity to 
multi-polarity. This affected the nature of the issues and structure of the global rules of 
governance. Some observers believed that the world is in transition where the emerging power, 
particularly India and China, will challenge the existing ‘World Order’ and will remake it. But 
reality speaks different, at least for the time being. The rise of China and India owes a lot to the 
existing system and they have large stake in its stability. China and India are in the process of 
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development and any disruption in the existing system will bring catastrophic social, political 
and economic consequences for the two countries. Therefore, India and China are not in a 
position to challenge the existing order, nor they can shoulder the burden that would result from 
change. Their behavior at various regional and multilateral organizations confirms their status 
quo position. Similarly, our empirical finding shows that China and India’s interdependency on 
each other and on the rest of world is on rise.  
 
But it does not mean that China and India are satisfied with their current positions. They 
start asking for more power and representation in global decision making. Their rising stature 
and expanding influence shows that it is difficult to deny them anymore of their role in matter of 
global governance. They want to turn the table on major powers and secure their position but 
within the system. Similarly, their rise is good news for developing countries who demand 
reform in the global governance for long time. For them the rise of China and India is a hope. 
However, confrontation between China and India will be highly detrimental and can put them off 
the track. Being developing countries, they have common stake in matters of international affairs 
and face similar problem at domestic level. Therefore, China and India is in the process of 
redefining their relations and enhanced cooperation under changing imperatives. Out and inside 
pressure beside common interest and values are pushing them in that direction. For increased 
cooperation China and India need to erect open, transparent and efficient institutions structure 
based on neo-liberal ideology mixed with indigenous knowledge in order to address the current 
issues and future challenges.   
 
 35 
In short, our paper assumes that India and China has a lot to cooperate than to confront. 
China and India are neighboring countries who can not escape geography nor can they run away 
from their good or bad shadows. Therefore, China and India need to stand up to the moment and 
fix problems of the existing ‘Order’ and contribute to peace, stability and development beyond 
their borders.  
  
For centuries India and China fell and rose together independently, however, in this 
interdependent world their rise and fall will not be mutually exclusive. Their cooperation, 
assuming active role and rule bound approach is a ‘necessary condition for assuming peace and 
global leadership in the increasingly interdependent world.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 1 
 
 
Gross National Income Data  
Year LOGC (China) LOGI (India) LOGU (USA) 
1980 11.38976 11.46925 12.44034 
1981 11.45064 11.53259 12.49139 
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1982 11.51523 11.57161 12.51315 
1983 11.5784 11.61862 12.54335 
1984 11.65625 11.6503 12.59164 
1985 11.72292 11.68587 12.62003 
1986 11.76793 11.71546 12.64097 
1987 11.82782 11.74422 12.6706 
1988 11.8893 11.79761 12.70702 
1989 11.92332 11.83825 12.73315 
1990 11.95667 11.87717 12.75626 
1991 12.00909 11.89533 12.77036 
1992 12.0751 11.92753 12.79313 
1993 12.1399 11.95776 12.81356 
1994 12.20258 11.99497 12.84172 
1995 12.25123 12.03733 12.86549 
1996 12.30097 12.07734 12.89152 
1997 12.34919 12.10324 12.91993 
1998 12.38576 12.1354 12.94663 
1999 12.42378 12.17728 12.97312 
2000 12.47003 12.20227 13.00305 
2001 12.51341 12.23382 13.01658 
2002 12.56007 12.25831 13.02781 
2003 12.61292 12.30026 13.04694 
2004 12.66804 12.34529 13.07596 
2005 12.7264 12.39795 13.10573 
2006 12.79436 12.44993 13.13447 
2007 12.86627 12.50453 13.14913 
2008 12.91631 12.52985 13.15809 
2009 12.95915 12.57087 13.14375 
2010 13.00256 12.61545 13.16451 
2011 13.05195 12.65252 13.18217 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sum of Export and Import Volume Index (2000 as base year) 
Year TRCH (China) TRIN (India) TRUS (USA) 
1980 16.12197291 49.10888973 52.61958053 
1981 18.61131151 49.49888893 53.67882424 
1982 17.52448656 50.77936481 50.06237967 
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1983 18.42152989 48.87559188 51.22191432 
1984 22.66617394 51.94357866 59.03055992 
1985 29.7458129 52.4805037 60.62163815 
1986 31.47686483 52.10876061 67.88036735 
1987 35.02434106 59.02383764 77.22953002 
1988 43.62048392 68.30052403 86.90967596 
1989 47.3558787 77.33507965 92.79143365 
1990 48.61481965 88.16593422 102.0746625 
1991 57.19570876 81.51573063 102.4989479 
1992 69.88526076 92.07722456 109.5810575 
1993 82.99967117 95.1309187 112.4971985 
1994 99.91974223 111.1410856 127.3846463 
1995 118.397848 139.6379373 135.9958986 
1996 122.3582907 151.7576323 145.2173353 
1997 136.5390129 163.0211369 159.5303878 
1998 136.0709458 162.3183917 162.2293832 
1999 151.8974678 175.3418663 173.1152076 
2000 200 200 200 
2001 215.0138462 200.122333 186.882807 
2002 261.8276028 228.5524984 183.9506909 
2003 359.2811387 279.9574865 196.1655854 
2004 487.4979366 374.51583 225.8094582 
2005 599.1495435 512.3064774 253.7967437 
2006 740.8643516 633.816049 285.0982134 
2007 913.6210091 797.6838833 309.172605 
2008 1076.180235 1081.630274 338.6772572 
2009 928.5036017 888.3248827 262.6240244 
2010 1253.794197 1204.701958 319.7281825 
2011 1536.272335 1587.104295 369.2257746 
 
Methodology 
 In this section we discuss three models that we will employ in order to understand the 
relation among China, India and The US.   
Model 1: VECM Co-integration Vector 
 
 
[∆Zti ]= [bi] + [Bij,i ] x  [∆Zi,t-1 ] +-----+ [Bij, m] x [∆Zt-1,i ] + [ξi ] X [ECMt-1] + [μi]   (1) 
 
 
 
Where [ .] in eq(1) represent the vector form of the of coefficient i.e. ‘b’ and ‘B’ and Z represent 
the variables used in the model. Here our variables are the log values of China, India and United 
States GNI. ECM is the error correction term. If the results show long run cointegration (i.e. 
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negative and significant values of ECM-1) then we will apply Wald test to measure short run 
relation among the variables.  
 
Model 2: Granger Causality  
 
tTRCH  t
k
i
iti
k
i
iti TRINTRCH          
11
 



    (2) 
tTRIN  t
k
i
iti
k
i
iti TRCHTRIN          
11
 



     (3) 
 
 
In Granger Causality eq(2) and (3),TRCH, TRIN stands for trade volume of China and India. For 
granger causality our null hypothesis is β=λ=0. Similarly, we will replace the values of US trade 
in the above equations in order to measure the bilateral casual impact of US trade in relation with 
Indian and Chinese trade.  
 
 
Model 3: Augmented Granger Causality 
 
However, it is generally observed that the F-test is ineffective when the variables display an 
integrated or cointegrated structure and the test statistics lack a standard distribution (Zapata and 
Rambaldi, 1997). In such condition, when the data is integrated or cointegrated, the general tests 
applied for exact linear restrictions on the parameters (e.g. the Wald test) do not exhibit usual 
asymptotic distributions. To deal with this problem and avoid stationarity and cointegration that 
we can face in running the granger causality test, we can use the procedure proposed by Toda 
and Yamamoto (1995) of augmented granger causality. 
 
This procedure modified Wald test (MWald) for restrictions on the parameters of )(kVAR . 
When a VAR
)( maxdk  is predicted (where k is the lag length in the system and max
d
 is the 
maximal order of integration to occur in the system). This test displays asymptotic chi-square 
distribution and considers the selection procedure valid whenever max
dk 
. The model is as  
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Table 1: The VECM Granger Causality 
Dependent variables Direction of causality  
Short run Long run 
 D(LOGC) D(LOGI) D(LOGU) ECMt-1 
D(LOGC) ---- 2.899446 
(0.2100) 
9.264212 
(0.0095) 
-0.369872 
(0.0013) 
D(LOGI) 0.265147 
(0.2917) 
---- -0.044907 
(0.8418) 
-0.224886 
(0.1679) 
D(LOGU) 5.755528 
(0.0580) 
0.1687109 
(0.9092) 
---- -0.219202 
(0.0647) 
Table2: Variance Decomposition 
 Variance Decomposition of LOGC: 
 Period S.E. LOGC LOGI LOGU 
 1  0.009598  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.016582  99.42917  0.494132  0.076697 
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Fig: 1` 
 3  0.022255  95.24748  4.207078  0.545438 
 4  0.027324  87.34907  11.33139  1.319534 
 5  0.032058  79.16105  18.84451  1.994445 
 6  0.036367  73.01841  24.61268  2.368910 
 7  0.040203  69.08888  28.42663  2.484490 
 8  0.043642  66.65590  30.89506  2.449033 
 Variance Decomposition of LOGI 
 Period S.E. LOGC LOGI LOGU 
 1  0.009544  7.626222  92.37378  0.000000 
 2  0.014609  18.11736  81.87584  0.006796 
 3  0.018575  26.67939  73.24395  0.076656 
 4  0.022047  32.34496  67.45191  0.203132 
 5  0.025312  35.01110  64.69641  0.292492 
 6  0.028488  35.54255  64.11561  0.341842 
 7  0.031597  34.96352  64.65309  0.383382 
 8  0.034615  34.00049  65.55485  0.444663 
Variance Decomposition of LOGU: 
 Period S.E. LOGC LOGI LOGU 
 1  0.009384  30.58383  0.848648  68.56752 
 2  0.013394  35.06634  2.551125  62.38254 
 3  0.016685  42.17748  1.646748  56.17577 
 4  0.019696  47.69540  2.010038  50.29456 
 5  0.022468  50.96928  2.814140  46.21658 
 6  0.024950  52.61756  3.316468  44.06597 
 7  0.027176  53.25589  3.530528  43.21359 
 8  0.029213  53.31845  3.657775  43.02378 
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Table3: Pair wise Granger Causality Tests for Trade 
Null Hypothesis F-Statistic Probability 
TRCH does not Granger Cause TRUS  2.49248  0.07763 
  TRUS does not Granger Cause TRCH  4.38342  0.01116 
  TRIN does not Granger Cause TRUS  7.76189  0.00070 
  TRUS does not Granger Cause TRIN  8.43175  0.00044 
  TRIN does not Granger Cause TRCH  107.319  9.2E-13 
  TRCH does not Granger Cause TRIN  63.8695  9.5E-11 
Table 4: Augmented Granger Causality Test Results for Trade  
Null Hypothesis: F- p values Chi-sq p values 
Combined causality of Tri and Tru on Trc 0.0000 0.0000 
TRi does not Granger Cause Trc 0.0006 0.0005 
Tru does not Granger Cause Trc 0.0186 0.0056 
Combined causality of Trc, Tru on Tri 0.0000 0.0000 
Trc does not Granger Cause Tri 0.0004 `0.0000 
Tru does not Granger Cause Tri 0.10425 0.1000 
Combined causality of Tri and Trc on Tru 0.0000 0.0000 
Trc does not Granger Cause Tru 0.0687 0.0403 
Tri does not Granger Cause Tru 0.0565 0.0306 
